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The Navy attempts to always employ ships constructed of reliable
material to protect and defend the United States against attack on the sea,
under the sea, and in the air. To this end, there is a strong and growing
interest in the administrative procedures for assuring that the ships parts
procured by the Navy are of the required quality.^- This interest has been
catalyzed by an increasing recognition of the tangible and intangible costs
to the public and the government of inferior quality. Understandably,
material quality is of vital concern to the Department of the Navy, a buyer
and consumer of vast quantities of supplies and equipment.
The Department of the Navy has been directed by the Secretary of
Defense to procure and operate its vessels at the lowest possible cost.
In this context, one of the prime objectives is to obtain quality ships
parts at a reasonable price. ^ Within the Department, the Naval Ship Systems
Command (NAVSHIP) 3 and the Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) are both
responsible for the attainment of this objeotive.
U.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel, Logistic
Support of the Navy (NAVPERS 10495), September 15, 1965, p. 1.
2U.S., Department of Defense, Office of Secretary of Defense,
Quality and Reliability Management (Volume I), August 4, 1966, p. 53.
3A li
at page vi.





While NAVSHIP and NAVSUP are both responsible for the procurement of
ships parts, NAVSUP is concerned primarily with the procurement of replacement
parts that conform to the quality requirements specified by NAVSHIP. These
requirements are provided either in the form of standard specifications or
letters, notices, and instructions periodically promulgated to cover specific
issues. Yet, despite these precautionary procedures, serious administrative
problems still arise concerning the quality of material as evidenced by the
continual receipt of failure reports from the end users. The purpose of this
study is to:
1. Identify and clarify the organizational relationships and respon-
sibilities of NAVSHIP and NAVSUP as they relate to the quality control of
ships parts,
2. Examine and evaluate NAVSHIP* s and NAVSUP *s supply support quality
control procedures applicable to the acquisition of these parts,
3. Define and appraise NAVSHIP's and NAVSUP's joint defective preven-
tion program for controlling and improving the reliability of ships parts,
and
4. Recommend changes to administrative controls which will correct any
weaknesses noted by this study and thus aid in the acquisition of ships parts
of the required quality.
The Method
The method that this study employs for clarifying the organizational
relationships and responsibilities of NAVSHIP and NAVSUP and evaluating the
administrative procedures associated therewith which relate to the quality
control of material will involve:

1. A comprehensive clarification of the quality control organizations
and responsibilities of NAVSHIP and NAVSUP,
2. An examination of the current system and administrative supply
support quality oontrol procedures applicable to the acquisition of ships
parts,
3. An objective appraisal of current performance in terms of results
and problems as they relate to the defective prevention program, and
4. The formulation of recommendations in terms of modifying, expanding,
simplifying, or combining procedures which comprise the system for the purpose
of aiding in the achievement of greater reliability in the ships parts
required by the Navy.
Sources of Data and Information
The calendar years 1963, 1964, and 1965 were selected for analysis of
prior performance (a) beoause they were current and (b) because they are con-
sidered specifically representative of future conditions in terms of the
expected problems now inherent in obtaining and identifying quality material.
Statistics used in the preparation of this paper were obtained from NAVSHIP,
NAVSUP, and the Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC) files and records as well
as reports from industry. In addition to written records, unstructured inter-
views were conducted with personnel of the Department of the Navy as well as
with representatives of industry cognizant of the material quality control






The Assumptions and Limitations
It was recognized that there may be an initial increase in cost
involved in implementing recommended changes in the present administrative
quality control procedures. It has been assumed, though, that any reduction
in the number of failures and any increase in the safety of personnel and
equipment which might be realized would ultimately justify or outweigh the
initial increase in cost, if such increase should occur.
In addition to the restrictions on the use of privileged information
mentioned in the Preface, the following assumptions and limitations have
also been imposed:
1. Continuation of the existing NAVSHIP, NAVSUP, and their field
organizational structure and staffing has been assumed.
2. Corrective recommendations have been restricted to those which
do not involve or require either the enactment of a new federal statute or
the amendment of an existing statute.
3. Since material support is received from numerous sources, examina-
tion of specific supply support quality control procedures has been restricted
to those that NAVSHIP, NAVSUP, and SPCC follow in the acquisition of ships
parts.
4. The technical development and manufacture of ships parts has pur-
posely been avoided since the matter is considered a separate topic and not




The dictionary describes "quality" as "the degree of excellence which
a thing possesses."* This same dictionary interprets "control" as the
"authority to direct or regulate."2
With these definitions in mind, the purpose of this paper is to review
the Navy's current administrative methods of supervising the degree of excel-
lence of the equipments, components, repair parts and materials that make up
her fighting ships. The review will include an examination of the procedures
involved with the view of improvement in those areas not now exercising the
full potential of the management controls available.
Since the degree of excellence of any product oan be high or low, it
will be assumed in this study that the quality required for Navy material and
hardware will be the highest degree obtainable within the framework of the
operational need and costs involved. However, as explained in the Introduction,
initial increased costs will not be considered if the end quality product will
eventually prove more economical when performance and safety are considered.
A oertain amount of background information is necessary in order to gain
appreciation for the objectives, methods, and results of any system. The
•^Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language (College ed.;
Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1966), p. 1189.
2Ibid., p. 322.

administration of quality control by the Navy is no exception. However, since
the Navy is a complex military establishment, characterized by a highly formal
organization with major segments having explicit detailed missions, a resume
of those major segments most responsible for quality control of Navy material
and hardware is appropriate.
NAVSH1P Organization and Mission
NAVSH1P is organized in eight functional areas under the direction of
six Deputy Commanders, a Direotor of Contracts, and a Comptroller. The Com-
mander of NAVSHIP delegates to each Deputy Commander, to the Director of
Contracts, and to the Comptroller full authority and responsibility for the
work of his assigned area, subject only to their discretion with respect to
questions which they should submit to the Commander or Vice Commander of
NAVSHIP for deoision or further instructions.3
The core of NAVSHEP's mission is the design, construction, and main-
tenance of the ships of the fleet. The scientific, engineering, and tech-
nical functions required to accomplish this mission are under the direotion
of the Deputy Commanders for Research and Development; Design, Shipbuilding
and Fleet Maintenance; Technical Logistics; and Nuclear Propulsion. The ad-
ministrative and management functions are under the direction of the Deputy
Commander for Plans and Administration, the Deputy Commander for Field Activ-
ities and Inspector General, the Director of Contracts, and the Comptroller.
3See U. S. Department of the Navy, Naval Ships Systems Command, Naval
Ship Systems Command Administrative Manual for a detailed description of the
missions and organization of NAVSHIPS. Unless otherwise indioated, the sub-
sequent discussions of NAVSHIP' s organization and missions in this Chapter
are based on this publication.
>.
Eaoh of the above major segments of NAVSHIP, while operating with a
large degree of independence, still contributes to the efforts of each other
in the overall mission to build and maintain ships. For example, most, if
not all, of the Divisions of NAVSHIP having engineering or technical respon-
sibilities participate in the planning and exeoution of the Researoh, Develop-
ment, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) program even though this program is the
direct responsibility of the Deputy Commander for Research and Development.
Others could not function until the Deputy Commander for Design, Shipbuilding
and Fleet Maintenance produces the overall ship design from which a new ship
is built or an existing ship is modified. Without the efforts of the Deputy
Commander for Technical Logistics, who is responsible for the engineering,
development, design, production, and maintenance of components, equipments,
and equipment systems that are installed in naval ships or used in shipbuild-
ing or fleet support, others could not function. By the same token, nuclear
ships of the fleet would not be completed without the efforts of the Deputy
Commander for Nuclear Propulsion.
The general organization pattern provides that, within eaoh deputy com-
mander's area, responsibilities at the division level are associated with
broad areas of interest and the functions performed with respeot to these
areas of interest. Within each division area functional responsibilities at
the branch levels are usually associated with an item or system. With respeot
to systems, definitions do not permit any logical means of breakdown or inter-
pretations which can be used to assign responsibilities for systems, subsystems,
equipment or components. Therefore, assignments of responsibilities are based
on the function performed with respect to systems. Various codes in NAVSHIP
perform the same functions except for the different systems involved. Certain
.
8codes will perform different functions for the same systems assigned to other
codes. The difference in functions usually results from time -phased situa-
tions such as oontraot design, construction, and maintenance stages for a
ship system, or the study and prototype stage of the RDT4E tasks.
The following definitions and comments vith respect to systems and
subsystems provide the framework for the use of these terms throughout this
paper:
1. System - a combination of parts, assemblies and sets joined
together to perform a specific operational function or functions.
2. Subsystem - a system in itself which forms a part of a larger
and more extensive system. Subsystems in themselves involve elements and
functional consideration similar to those of the systems they support.
Hence the elements of a subsystem are treated in the same manner as is used
for system assignments of areas of interest.
Functional responsibilities assigned to some NAVSHIP's codes are based
on the following amplification. Design is intended in the broad sense to mean
engineering effort. System design therefore means the required technical
effort to integrate a system to accomplish its function by selecting and ap-
plying available equipment and component designs, where appropriate, and when
not available, to establish the basic performance characteristics of equip-
ment and components required to meet the integrated system performance in
accomplishing its functions. Equipment and component design means the re-
quired effort to provide such equipment and components to meet specified
performance and characteristics.
^U.S., Department of the Navy, Naval Ship Systems Command, Bureau of
Ships Instruction 5432.1 Change 5; Naval Ship System Command Manual (BuShips
Instruction), March 15, 1963, p. 3.

System design functional responsibilities as they apply to other
NAVSHIP's oodes are based on the following general pattern. Ship design
from oonoept of a speoifio ship design through completion of the oontraot
design is the responsibility of one code. System and subsystem design not
specifically related to a particular ship or ship class, and equipment and
component design, is the responsibility of another code. Where applicable
to a specific selection of equipment for ship design, coordination is accom-
plished by the code responsible for design from concept to completion of
contract.
While the above is only a cursory review of NAVSHIP'S organization
and responsibilities, it is sufficient to impress the reader that this Com-
mand is veil organized to acoomplish its mission to build and repair Navy
ships. The staffing includes a great number of highly qualified people who
are experts in their field and veil versed in the need for a quality product
vhether it be a complete ship or a small repair part. Instructions, confer-
ences, symposiums, and like media available to such personnel, all combine to
impress the need for quality control in product and thinking. Some of these
vill be discussed in Chapter II.
There are tvo types of field activities vhioh are directly pertinent to
NAVSHIP's overall responsibility for the procurement, construction, conversion,
and repair of naval ships. These are: (1) the offioes of Supervisors of
Shipbuilding (SUPSHIPs) and (2) the offices of Industrial Managers (iNDMANs).
SUPSHIPs offices are located at private shipyards and perform a variety of
duties including the administration of Navy and Department of Defense con-
tracts with the shipbuilder, liaison duty betveen the shipbuilder and the
Navy Supply System and perform general oversight during the construction
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program. INDMANs offices have the responsibility to contract with private
shipyards for the repair of Navy ships.
Consistent with their broad mission of administering Department of
Defense contracts with their assigned private shipyards, SUPSHIPs are respon-
sible for performing a multiple of procurement functions, including contract-
ing for changes, approving progress payments, consenting to the placement of
certain subcontracts, and the awarding of design contracts. They also assist
with the outfitting of naval ships.
The offices of SUPSHIPs are organized in a manner prescribed by NAVSHIP.
Deviations from this organization must be approved by the offioe of the Deputy
Commander for Field Activities, and personnel ceilings and billet structures
and descriptions are also controlled by the same office.
°
This paper is concerned with the missions of SUPSHIPs to perform pro-
curement functions, award design contracts, and assist in the outfitting of
ships. In this capacity, SUPSHIPs are in an exoellent position to monitor
quality control requirements and insure that vessels outfitted do in fact
have the complete range and depth of quality material specified. Further,
authority to issue field changes to contracts is delegated to SUPSHIPs for
certain items. This authority, however, is restricted to the following cate-
gories which generally do not involve specification changes:
1. Repairs or changes to Government Furnished Material (GFM) to make
it suitable for its intended use;
2. Accomplishment of authorized government responsible trial items
of work not required by the contract;
^U.S., Department of the Navy, Naval Ship Systems Command, Shipbuilding
and Boat Building Contract Manual (SUPSHIP Manual), January, 1962, para. 3-1.
' •
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3. Repairs to existing parts and components of a ship under a
conversion contract;
4. Correction of government responsible design defects in systems or
components which, if not corrected, would prevent operation in accordance
with specifications;
5. Value engineering changes, subjeot to NAVSHIP approval for specific
types of changes;
6. Packaging, preparation for delivery, or other aotion related to
disposal of GFM;
7. Contractor responsible defects and deficiencies not required to be
corrected by the contractor;
8. No cost or reduced cost changes not involving specifications;
9. Insurance claims which are payable by the government under the
terms of the contract (prior olearanoe must be obtained from Chief of Naval
Material)
;
10. Correction of design deficiencies that are considered essential by
the prospective Commanding Officer of the ship under construction and con-
curred in by SUPSHIPs, provided each change does not exceed $5,000.00 per
ship and is of the type normally considered as an alteration;
11. So-called "Polaris" ohanges vhich are unique because of their
Fleet Ballistic Missile features and do not exceed $50,000.00 in estimated
price, affect basic ship characteristics, or jeopardize delivery dates;
12. Changes to incorporate provisions of mandatory, government
-




13. Changes specifically authorized for field issuance by NAVSHIP's
directives.
The above responsibilities indioate that SUPSKLPs offices are an
important link in the administrative chain concerned with the control of
material quality. By the physical looation at the building site, they can
do much to insure that the ship delivered to the Navy is of the highest
quality obtainable consistent with the design requirements of NAVSHIP and
the multitude of quality requirements inherent in building specifications.
There are certain NAVSHIP Technical Representatives (NSTRs) assigned
by major divisions of NAVSHIP and located at prime contractors' plants to
represent the Navy in all matters pertinent to NAVSHIP's contracts. For
example, the Naval Reactors Division of NAVSHIP contracts with a prime con-
tractor for special propulsion plants to be provided to building yards for
installation in nuclear submarines or surface craft. Since the contract
involves many thousands of dollars and extensive technical coordination
effort, NAVSHIP has established a liaison offioe at the contractor's plant
to handle all faoets of the oontract both from an administrative and tech-
nical standpoint. Technically, all direction is received from NAVSHIP.
Contractually, this liaison office represents the Defense Contract Admin-
istration Services Region (DCA3R)
.
Among other duties, NSTRs perform the following major functions:
1. Monitor the NAVSHIP's contracts from establishment to delivery of
all equipment,






3. Maintain constant surveillance of oontraotor's activity and progress
in the procurement of necessary components and repair parts,
4. Review and insure contractor's recommendations for component and
repair part support required for building ships are acceptable to NAVSHIP,
5. Resolve technical problems as they arise concerning design, quality
control requirements, or subcontractor performance,
6. Review and insure provisioning documentation prepared by the con-
tractor or subcontractors is acceptable to NAVSHIP prior to forwarding such
documentation to the Navy Supply System,
7. Provide liaison between the contractor and the Navy Supply System
for all matters pertaining to required system stock, on-board support, and
tender load requirements,
8. Review and rejeot or obtain NAVSHIP approval for requests from Navy
Inventory Control Points (ICPs) for deviations in specification requirements
when such activities are procuring support material,
9. Insure that contractors provide necessary source data to permit
ICPs to develop and publish allowance parts lists (APLs) and coordinated
shipboard allowance lists (COSALs) , and
10. Coordinate all effort in the procurement, shipping, and listing of
all equipment, material, and parts required for outfitting. 7
A review of the above responsibilities indicates that NSTRs are also an
important link in the Navy's quality control chain. The representatives in-
volved are in a position to contribute much to the Navy's desire to maintain
the best fighting ships in the world.




NAVSUP Organization and Mission
NAVSUP, among other things, is responsible for the development, review,
and promulgation of Navy -vide policies and methods governing supply manage-
ment of Navy material and the administration of centrally controlled programs
in connection therewith. As used herein, "supply management" means the cal-
culation of requirements, acquisition, and control of the receipt, avail-
ability, issue, and disposal of Navy material and includes provisioning,
cataloging, standardization, stock coordination, inventory management, dis-
tribution, transportation, traffio management, materials handling, receipt,
storage, packing, and preservation functions. This includes a responsibility
for the following:
1. The development and operation of the Navy Supply System,
2. The research, development, test and evaluation of materials,
methods, equipment and systems ashore and afloat consistent with NAVSUP
responsibilities
,
3. The management of the Navy Stock Fund and designated segments of
the Navy Management Fund and such other funds or accounts as may be assigned,
and
4. The centralized direction of procurement of materials and servioes
throughout the Department of the Navy for which no other proouring activity
q
is otherwise delegated procurement responsibility.
a
See U. S., Department of the Navy, Naval Supply Systems Command, Bureau
of Supplies and Accounts Manual . Vol. 1, for a detailed description of the
missions and organizations of NAVSUP. Unless otherwise indicated, the subse-
quent discussions of NAVSUP organizations and missions in this chapter are
based on this publication.
^J. S., Department of the Navy, Naval Supply Systems Command, Organization
Manual; NAVSUP 70 . January, 1964, pp. 1-2 through 1-5.
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Except as otherwise prescribed in Navy regulations or by the Secretary
of the Navy, the Commander of NAVSUP is responsible for the technical guid-
ance and direction, Navy -wide, of the performance of functions, inherent in
his general duties and responsibilities. Under the Chief of Naval Material
(CNM) , the Commander of NAVSUP directs or provides primary support for the
following types of field organizations and activities (only those most re-
sponsible for quality control of Navy ship material are indicated)
:
1. Inventory Control Points,




6. Navy Supply Research and Development Facility,
7. Fuel Depots and Annexes, and
8. Nuclear Weapons Supply Annexes.
NAVSUP is directed by a Commander who has the additional title of Chief
of the Supply Corps and Navy Professional Assistant to the Secretary of the
Navy. Orders and policy issued by Commander, NAVSUP, in the execution of
his assigned functions, are considered as coming from the CNM and the Secretary
of the Navy. The Vice Commander of NAVSUP acts in his absence.
To assist the Commander and Vice Commander in their duties, a Policy
Council is established to provide a communication media between Command and
top management officials in which major policy and objectives and important
matters of current interest are discussed and brought to the attention of
counoil members. Individual members of the council in turn serve as a line
of communication between top management and NAVSUP personnel. The council,

16
in addition to the Commander and Vice Commander, NAVSUP, is composed of the
Inspeotor General of the Supply Corps, Deputy Commanders of NAVSUP, NAVSUP
Comptroller, and Staff Directorates.
A NAVSUP Deputy Commander for Policy and Plans is responsible for the
analysis of broad supply support requirements as reflected in planning docu-
ments issued by appropriate authority. This includes a responsibility for
the analysis of environmental and organization trends within the Department
of Defense as they relate to supply support; translation of these require-
ments, trends, and other guidance and planning factors into NAVSUP or Naval
Material Support Establishment policies, programs, and goals to meet the long
range support needs of the Navy, as distinguished from specialized supply
policy and implementation thereof whioh is the responsibility of other Deputy
Commanders; development and promulgation of Department of the Navy policy
governing supply and distribution of Navy material in conformance with ex-
ternal policy.
A Deputy Commander for Purchasing is responsible for the technical
direotion of field purchase functions and management control of Navy Purchas-
ing Offices. He is supported in this mission by Contract Appeals, Purchase
Policy, and Field Assistance Divisions which resolve contract problems, estab-
lish and promulgate purchase policy, and assist field activities in procure-
ment matters.
The Deputy Commander for Supply Operations is responsible for the
formulation, establishment and implementation of polioy and direotion, plan-
ning and coordination of NAVSUP and the interservice supply management respon-
sibilities for inventory management. This enoompasses a responsibility for
the input, availability, and disposal of material; the development and
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administration of NAVSUP fleet supply and logistics support programs; the
exercising of NAVSUP management control over ICPs, Navy retail offices and
the Fleet Support Office and technical direction over inventory control
functions at Navy stock points.
The Deputy Commander for Researoh and Development is responsible for
the development, administration, and coordination of the research and develop-
ment programs of NAVSUP and for the creation of new hypotheses and plans for
development of changes to the Navy Supply System. He is assisted by the per-
sonnel assigned to the Equipment and Materials Research and Systems Research
Divisions who plan and administer equipment and materials research test and
development programs for planning, design, and technical guidance of ships'
supply characteristics and facilities as well as conduot research in supply
and logistios areas of interest. °
Field ICPs have been established to administer the Navy Supply System
for oategories of material as assigned by the NAVSHTP and other technical
commands having overall cognizance of the material involved. Each ICP, of
which there are currently three—the Ships Parts Control Center, Mechanics
-
burg, Pennsylvania; the Electronics Supply Office, Great Lakes, Illinois;
and the Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania—is under the
joint control of NAVSUP and the technical command having prime responsibility
for the material administered by the ICP. Some of the teohnical commands
retain the management control of certain categories of material, such as
major propulsion and generating components, and although not specifically
designated ICPs, these commands perform the same inventory control functions
for this material as the ICPs perform for the items assigned to such ICPs.
10Ibid.
, pp. 04 -2 through 04-31.
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ICPs do not maintain stocks of material but are offices, the function of
which, as stated in general terms, is to assure a proper balanoe between the
supply of and the demand for individual items of material required for opera-
tion and maintenance of Navy ships, aircraft and shore facilities. The
attainment of its objective, in general, among other things, requires an
ICP to:
1. Assure that sufficient quantities of required material are on hand
to supply users at all times;
2. Assure that by control of procurement, long supply or short supply
will be curtailed by organizing a scheduled flow into the supply system;
3. Assure the prompt redistribution of local excesses and declaration
of surplus as appropriate;
4. Maintain a proper distribution system for material under its
cognizance;
5. Garry out extensive teohnical research programs in order to assure
that all material controlled by the ICP is properly identified, cataloged,
and stock numbered and interchangeability between items may be determined;
6. Develop and promulgate methods and procedures for recording and
reporting stook status of material on hand;
7. Maintain close liaison with NAVSHIP and other technical commands
for the purpose of incorporating ohanges, new designs, obsolesoence, and
other planning information for material under its control;
8. Maintain olose liaison with stock points and other activities
stocking material controlled by ICP;
9. Recommend to NAVSUP and other technical commands as appropriate
the transfer of cognizance of material that may be inappropriately stocked
by the ICP or other ICPs or the technical command;
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10. Perform all provisioning actions necessary to procure components
and repair parts, and schedule the delivery of these parts and components
as requested by NAVSHIP and other technical commands;
11. Recommend and take aotion as appropriate to standardize components
and parts vhere suoh action is feasible and desirable;
12. Prepare APLs for each oomponent or equipment under the program
support of the ICP;
13. Plan for, prepare, and publish COSALs for operating ships as
directed;
14. Determine range and depth of repair parts, components, and materials
necessary to outfit tenders supporting operating ships;
15. Procure ships parts and provide necessary data to publish tender
load lists. 11
NAVSUP and their field activities also are staffed with large numbers
of highly trained and competent people who are involved in obtaining ships
parts of the required quality at the least possible price. As with NAVSHIP,
NAVSUP and field organisations prepare instructions, attend conferences and
symposiums, and through other media obtain direction and advice which stresses
quality control and its advantages. Some of these will be discussed in
Chapter II and Chapter III of this paper.
11U.S., Department of the Navy, Naval Supply System Command, Bureau of
Supplies and Accounts Instruction 4421. 17A; Material Mission of the Ships
Parts Control Center (BuSandA Instruction), July 16, 19615, p. 1-9.

CHAPTER II
EXAMINATION OF THE SYSTEM
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the current system utilized
by NAVSHIP and NAVSUP as veil as their field activities in obtaining quality
material for naval applications. The objective is one of identification and
familiarization rather than analysis. Analytical examination has been re-
served for Chapters III and IV.
NAVSHIP Existing System
Designing, building, outfitting, and contracting for a Navy ship is an
extremely complicated procedure involving many people and a variety of pro-
cedures. An examination of NAVSHIP' s organization as outlined in Chapter I,
and attendant organization manuals referenced, will indicate that much special-
ized effort is required before a Navy ship can be delivered. However, since
NAVSHIP has been involved in this operation for many years, procedures are
standardized to a high degree. True, with each new design, peculiar problems
inherent to this design will arise. True also, problems and procedures appli-
cable to a submarine will vary considerably from those involving an aircraft
carrier; however, basic system requirements remain about the same.
Tactical and logistic studies conducted by the Department of Defense
and the Chief of Naval Operations determine the need for a new naval ship or
additional ships of an existing type. Upon approval by Congress and authority
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from the Secretary of Defense, the NAVSHIP's Deputy Commander for Design,
Shipbuilding and Fleet Maintenance will produce the overall ship design
from vhioh a new ship is built or an existing ship is modified. In proceed-
ing with this function, a study will be conducted to determine the feasibility
and appropriateness of the design required. Then a preliminary ship design
is prepared. Following this will be the preparation of a contract design
in sufficient detail to permit the awarding of a oontraot for construction
of a ship. Specifications provided will contain technical requirements and
information relating to the construction of the specific ship involved. They
will describe the general design requirements of the ship and show essential
features, functions, and arrangements but not necessarily all the details of
the design. Together with the contract plans and the contraot guidance plans,
they define the ship as to dimensions, structural arrangement, performance,
tank capacities, armaments, and capabilities.
If the new ship authorized is to be similar to existing ships of the
fleet, detailed requirements will be very specific. For every major Navy
ship built, there is available a "Specification for Building Ships" manual
which describes in detail the various requirements for the ship. By refer-
ence to an existing manual, with major deviations delineated, NAYSHIP can
provide the shipbuilder with an extremely acourate set of requirements which
will permit him to bid on the ship with assurance that he is fully aware of
all requirements.
In the event the new ship authorized is not similar to existing ships
of the fleet, more extensive research will be required by NAV3HIP before the
shipbuilder can be provided with a set of requirements from which he can





spent by various divisions of NAVSHIP in the design and formulation of re-
quirements for the new ship. In any event, the ultimate result vill be a
"Specification for Building Ships" manual covering the nev ship. A review
of an existing manual indicates that subjects such as the following are








5. Welding and Allied Processes,
6. General Requirements for Hull Structure,
7. Foundations,
8. Hull Fittings,
9. Mast, Fairings and Periscopes,
10. Hydraulic Power Transmission System,
11. Rudders, Diving Planes and Steering Gear,
12. Control and Communication Stations,
13. Machinery and Piping Designating and Marking,
14. Electrical Designating and Marking,
15. Repair Parts and Stock Components,
16. General Requirements for Living Spaoes,
17. General Requirements for Machinery Plant,









22. General Requirements for Electric Power Distribution,
22. Switchboards and Panels, and
24. Nuclear or Conventional Propulsion .1
A review of the above requirements, which are only a sampling of sub-
jects oovered, will indicate levels of quality control required for the
equipment involved. Little is left to interpretation by the shipbuilder.
For example, the following samples of specifications provided for the SS(N)671
show how precise instructions are provided to the contractor:
Inspection Facilities — to conduct inspections, the supervisor
with his assistants, shall have access at all times to the works of the
contractor and shall be afforded every facility for the efficient prose-
cution of his work. By accepting a oontraot to which these specifica-
tions apply, the contractor recognizes and acknowledges his obligation
to protect the interests of the government, other contraotors, and him-
self by avoiding aotions end omissions whioh add to the burden of the
inspection service. The government reserves the right to require that
specified tests be conducted at the expense of the contractor by private
laboratory or by such other agency as the supervisor may approve, when
the exigencies of the situation demand.
Purchase Orders — shall contain oomplete information as to
applicable specifications and plans, firm name, location of subcontractor
or vendor, the location of the material, time of completion, and any other
information which may be of value or whioh may facilitate inspection.
Each procurement accomplished in fulfillment of these specifications
shall specify that the inspection and test requirements associated with
the procurement are for the convenience of the shipbuilding contractor
and the government and do not relieve the vendor of his responsibility
to provide a high quality produot which meets all the requirements of
the procurement. If during the contractor's or government's own test
or inspection of the equipment delivered under the procurement any con-
dition is uncovered which fails to meet all the requirements of the pro-
curement, the vendor is financially responsible for correcting these
conditions, regardless of the testing or inspecting required.*
Promptly after the award of a contract, the contractor is required to
prepare and submit to the supervisor schedules necessary for the purpose of
Mj.S., Department of the Navy, Naval Ship Systems Command, Specifications




establishing an orderly and systematic construction program. These schedules
are required to include but not be limited to the following:
1. The way schedule indicating availability of shipvays and estimated
time required for oonstruotion of the ship;
2. An erection sequence schedule to show the order in which the con-
struction of the ship will take place;
3. A plan schedule showing the availability dates of plans;
4. A schedule showing required dates for material, showing dates on
which all material items, including GFM, are required at the shipyard for
fabrication, erection or installation;
5. A material ordering schedule showing the dates upon which each item
should be ordered to meet above requirements.
The contractor is required to provide engineering and design services
in the preparation of quality assurance lists, a sea trial and certification
booklet and inspection, recording and reporting procedures and formats as
required to provide documentation of each Subsafe and hull integrity item.
He is required to certify the completion status of all Subsafe items in a
form suitable for audit, utilizing NAVSHIP's approved quality assurance lists,
the sea trial and certification booklet, the applicable submarine safety design
review procedure manual, inspection documentation and reporting procedures
prepared to meet the requirements specified above.
Further, the contractor is required to review the GFM vendor drawings,
checking them against the SubSafe requirements and prepare lists to identify
GFM non-destructive testing requirements needed to meet SubSafe certification.
The lists are then forwarded to NAVSHIP for review, approval, and authorization
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for accomplishment of the work required. 3
Supervisor of Shipbuilding *—The above requirements imposed on the
shipbuilder are specific and exacting; however, it is the responsibility of
the Supervisor of Shipbuilding (SUPSHEP) to insure that they are carried out.
When drawings and specifications impose high quality levels, Inspectors must
insure compliance. The supervisor receives specific guidance concerning his
mission as quality control overseer. He is responsible for planning and co-
ordinating the systematic discharge of the Department of the Navy's respons-
ibility for determining that all contractual requirements have been met prior
to acceptance of a ship by the government. To this end, the quality assurance
engineer is responsible to SUPSHIP for:
1. Planning a uniform method by which cognizant SUPSHEP' s personnel
may evaluate the effectiveness of the contractor's system for assuring quality;
2. Coordinating the original and continuing process of evaluating the
contractor's system for assuring quality;
3. Assuring that the contractor completely understands the quality
requirements of the contract;
4. Developing a system of feedback between the contractor and the
various departments of the SUPSHEP 's office for corrective actions to prevent
the occurrence of defective supplies or services;
5. Planning for systematic surveillance of the outputs of the contractor
in the areas of design, procurement, manufacturing, storage, materials handling
and operation, to assure conformance to contractual requirements, with surveil-






6. Applying statistical and quality measurement techniques in the
areas of verification inspection where applicable;
7. Providing SUPSHIP's planning to insure that contractual require-
ments for the prediction and measurement of reliability of systems and
equipments are met;
8. Developing new techniques and approaches for the analysis of the
quality problems;
9. Coordinating representation for SUPSMP concerning quality problems
created by oontraot requirements;
10. Conducting quality assurance training programs for SUPSHIP's per-
sonnel in the use of quality assurance techniques.*
NAVSHIP Provisioning Requirements . --are imposed on the shipbuilder in
each "Specification for Building Ships." A3 material requirements are identi-
fied and purchase orders are prepared, the shipbuilder will invoke applicable
provisioning specifications to insure that the appropriate Naval ICPs are
provided necessary data to procure Navy System Stock of components, repair
parts, and materials.
^
In regard to electronic equipment, the contractor is required to furnish
technical documentation and on-board repair parts for all contractor furnished
electronic equipment, components, and systems vhioh can be maintained by the
ship's force through the replacement of parts or components which fail. All
data is provided to the Electronic Supply Office (BSO) , which has the
4SUPSHIP Manual, loo, cit .. section 8-2.
5See U.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Ships Provisioning
Specification MIL-B-17362D (SHIPS) for electronic equipment and MIL-P-15137C
for hull, mechanical, and electrical equipment.
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responsibility to review such data and make determinations for system stock,
assign new federal stook numbers (FSNs) , identify items to existing F3Ns,
prepare APLs, and make necessary procurements to insure that ready for issue
material is always available.
Requirements for technical documentation for hull mechanical and
electrical equipment, components, systems, and repair parts are similar to
those for electronic equipment. The shipbuilder will forward this data,
though, to the U. 3. Navy Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC). 3PCC will per-
form essentially the same functions for this material as are performed by
ESQ for electronic equipment.
The following is typical of the type of technical drawings and related
data that the equipment contractor is to supply to the ICP:
1. Arrangement, schematic, outline, and assembly drawings, certifica-
tion data sheets and other desoriptive data, as applicable, necessary for
complete and positive identification of the component or equipment and for
determining the relationship of one component or assembly to another or to
the system as a whole;
2. Detail drawing, shop drawing, sketch and brief description, or
item description sufficient to establish positive identification of each
item recommended or selected as an on -board repair part and each item of
sufficient maintenance significance to warrant consideration for system stock;
the identifying data submitted shall contain complete identification including
physical, electrical, mechanical, and dimensional characteristics.
When a design or production change affecting a repair part(s) is incor-
porated in the equipment being procured subsequent to submission of technical
documentation to the ICP, the equipment contractor is required to immediately
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submit revised data to recipients of the provisioning list. 6 The data sub-
mitted must identify the part(s) changed, and must inolude detail drawings
or other identification media necessary for the ICP to procure the items
required.
Drawings submitted generally specify levels of quality control or
special requirements necessary to procure an item. Bills of material shown
on most assembly drawings indicate part numbers and actual manufacturers of
the various items indicated. This permits IGPs to prooure material directly
from the actual manufacturer or vendor rather than from the equipment contractor
NAVSHIP Technical Representatives .—NSTRs, who are responsible for the
procurement of installed components and on-board repair parts (GFM) for the
Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, have adopted a completely unique system to
insure that the ICP involved (SPCC) does, in fact, procure material to the
high quality levels required for this program. Prior to January, 1964, pro-
visioning technical documentation submitted to SPCC for identification and
procurement purposes was essentially the same as described above for the
shipbuilder and equipment oontraotor. Most material, parts, and components
purchased referenced a plan, piece number or part number with little or no
qualifying data. As a result, material supplied was as good as the details
contained on the drawing referenced or inherent in the part number identifi-
cation. However, since many drawings neglect to provide all quality control
requirements or leave much up to the discretion of the manufacturer, NSTRs
°U.S., Department of the Navy, Naval Ship Systems Command, Mechanical/
Electrical Equipment Form NAViHIP 4786/4786A . January, 1959.
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instituted specific procedures to insure that all requirements vere clear to
the ICP responsible for procuring baok-up system stook and tender load
material.
When the cognizant technical command engineer selects a component or
establishes design requirements for a nev component needed for the program,
a listing of all technical requirements is prepared including such cata as
drawings, specifications, finish requirements, cleaning requirements, packag-
ing, special tests, inspection requirements, welding procedures, chemical and
thermal limitation requirements, precautions in handling requirements, sources
of supply, and pricing information.
When the provisioning project (NAVSHIP Form 4786) is prepared, an adden-
dum page is added itemizing each of the requirements necessary to properly
procure a quality component. Since not all oomponent requirements apply to
each repair part, the "REMARKS" blook of the NAVSHIP Form 4786 is used to
indicate which of the total requirements apply to the specific repair part.
For example, a provisioning project for a valve indicates sixteen special
requirements needed to procure. Bach of the sixteen requirements is identi-
fied on the addendum page by an alpha designator, A to P. Line item one on
the project is the "valve stem." The "REMARKS" blook might indicate "A, B,
D, F, P." This informs the ICP that in order to prooure the "valve stem,"
special requirements "A, B, D, F, P" should be invoked in the contract to
insure that the manufacturer will consider each special requirement in addi-
tion to the plan, piece number, or part number also referenced in the oontraot.
In the event operating experience dictates a requirements change to any
component or repair part, NSTRs will revise the existing provisioning docu-
mentation and attendant supplemental ordering data pages and provide SPCC
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with new requirements necessary to purchase quality material. In addition,
each time a prime contractor, under the cognizance of NSTRs, procures any
components or repair parts, a copy of the purchase order used is provided
to 3PCC. 7
SPCC utilizes all the data provided and procures nuclear repair parts
and components to the exact specifications and special requirements indicated.
Further, the copies of prime contractor's purchase orders received, in addi-
tion to providing other souroes of supply, indicate the purchase price for
each item, which is valuable to SPCC in determining reasonableness of price
quoted by the same or other suppliers.
In order to insure quality, SPCC, as directed by NAVSHIP's Nuclear
Propulsion Commander, takes another additional step. Fourteen categories of
material such as pumps, valve parts, pipe and fittings require certification
and test reports with each purchase. Contraots for such items specify the
need for such documents and when received, are maintained on file pending
any difficulty with material in service. A review of such information pro-
vides SPCC with a means to determine that material received into the supply
system was certified to meet all specification and contract requirements.
If service failures develop, they also provide a source of information for
study which oould result in revised or strengthened requirements for future
procurements
.
7U.S., Department of the Navy, Naval Ship Systems Command, Naval Reactors
Procurement Memorandum #3 . October 22, 1963, p. 1 and Enclosure.
Letter from K. L. Woodfin, Naval Reactors Division, Bureau of Ships,




A reviev of NAVSHIP existing system will clearly indicate that the
burden cf determining technical requirements and quality control parameters
is the responsibility of this command; NAVSUP must comply with these require-
ments as they affect the procurement, stocking, storage, and cataloging of
back-up system material. Unless NAVSUP and their field activities procure
and have on hand the quality material necessary to keep ships operating,
much of the effort of NAVSHIP will be wasted. Further, the supply system
frequently is required to furnish components, parts, and materials to build
a ship. Much of the material necessary to outfit a ship with on-board spares
comes from the Navy Supply System. The following will highlight the major
areas of the current NAVSUP system:
NAVSUP Headquarters . —NAVSUP, under CNM, exercised administrative con-
trol over the Navy's supply operation. One of the most important functions
of the NAVSUP Headquarters organization is to provide complete direotion to
all operating supply segments. Probably the most important document published
by the Headquarters is the NAVSUP manual which provides direction to every
sub-command under NAVSUP cognizance and every supply officer in the corps.
Further, this manual is used for supply direction by the thousands of civilians
working for the Navy Supply System. Its various volumes discuss procedures
applicable to all supply areas, such as organization, operation, maintenance,
quality oontrol, reports, and requisitions, right down to the details of how
to prepare correspondence. This command provides daily guidance to all opera-
ting segments of the supply system via instructions, notices, letters, and
telephone as appropriate, to resolve supply problems. Conferences, symposiums,
and seminars are arranged to discuss such subjects as quality oontrol.
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Supply Aotivitles Afloat . —The field of logistios and the supply of the
fleet at the operating level are by and large the province of the Supply
Corps. The hundreds of supply activities throughout the world are primarily
concerned with supporting the fleet. In fulfilling this role, the activities
of the Supply Corps are allied closely with logistic type commands which are
established to implement the delivery of goods and services to the fighting
forces. The fleet supply officer is the adviser to the fleet commander on
all matters pertaining to fleet supply. Ships of a fleet are grouped by ship
types, each of which is under a type commander for purposes of administration.
The Commander Service Force is the principal logistic agent of the Fleet Com-
mander. With the exception of those functions specifically assigned to other
commanders or assigned under joint logistic agreements, the Commander Service
Force is charged with the planning, conduct, and administration of services
and supply of material to the fleet to carry out approved plans and polioies.
The Commander Service Force coordinates the utilization of available resources
to the best advantage of the fleet. Some of his major duties are as follows:
1. Advise and make recommendations to the Commander in Chief regarding
fleet polioies and plans for the supply of the fleet and shore activities of
the area, including the supply of material and standards of readiness;
2. Establish systems of requisitioning, stock oontrol, and issue of
material consistent with policies and directives of the Chief of Naval
Operations, NAVSUP, the responsible headquarters commands, and the Commander
in Chief of the fleet;





The ooamands and supply officers involved are most interested to see
that supplies are available for the operating fleet. However, it is the
supply offioer assigned to an individual ship who must aocount for all the
material reoeived and required to keep his ship in satisfactory operating
condition. This offioer has a variety of duties involving disbursing, sub-
sistence, stores and ship store items. He and his staff are in a most
important position to insure that material received for the operating fleet
maintains the high quality condition in vhioh it was received. His methods
of maintaining and administering acceptable storage procedures for the
material reoeived are a most important link in the quality control chain.
Many items of supply, especially delicate repair parts, require special
handling and storage. Many parts require that special cleaning be performed
on them before paokaging. If a supply offioer or his staff would not exer-
cise good judgment and remove such items from their protective packages in
order to conserve bin storage spaoe, much of the quality built into the item
could be lost. Further, as materiel or parts fail in operation on the ship,
the supply officer can do much to see that olear, oonoise failure reports
are provided to the teohnioal commands and the ICPs involved. Good reports,
with appropriate recommendations, can be instrumental in proper correction
of defeots and prevention of similar difficulties on other ships.
ICPs .—Once a Navy ship is operating, it is the duty of ICPs to insure
that it will remain operational by maintaining a supply of "ready for issue"
materials, components, and parts needed for repair, overhaul and maintenance.
Just having the parts available is not in itself sufficient. Ships must have
some means of identifying parts available in the supply system and relating






this identification to their speoifio requirements. This identifioation is
accomplished in a variety of ways, some of which are enumerated as follows:
1. Each part, component, or material is identified by a FSN.
2. Sach FSN is further identified by descriptive data such as plan
number, piece number, or part number.
3. Plan numbers, piece numbers, and part numbers, cross referenced to
FSNs, are published in catalogs such as the Fleet Oriented Consolidated Stock
List.
4. Sach component or equipment is further identified by a Component
Identification (CID) number.
5. For eaoh CID number assigned, there is an APL prepared which re-
flects a description of the component including technical characteristics
and a complete list of all repair parts required by the component, with each
part identified by its technical data and applicable FSN.
6. A listing of all the CID numbers applicable to a given ship is
compiled, from which is published a COSAL.
The COSAL is the ship supply officer's "Bible" for identifying, order-
ing, and providing replacement parts and material for malfunctioning ship
equipment. By the use of this publication he is able to perform the follow-
ing:
1. Determine the applicable CID number for a component requiring a
new repair part; this is accomplished by reference to the index of the COSAL
where eaoh equipment and component is listed by nomenclature and service
application.
2. Determine the repair part FSN; this is accomplished by referenoe
to the APL represented by the CID number located in the index. The APL shows
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complete technical characteristics for the component involved as well as a
complete list of all required repair parts with their part numbers and as-
signed FSNs. With this information, it is then possible to go to the proper
storage area or bin and obtain the required replacement part.
3. Determine how many of each repair part is allowed on-board to
support the equipment installed on the ship; this is accomplished by refer-
ence to the Stock Number Sequence List (SNSL) section of the COSAL. This
section shows each FSN listed on the various APLs and indicates which APL
utilize the various FSNs a3 well as the total quantity of each FSN allowed.
Obviously, the data that comprises ships' COSALs entails more than
just a listing of numbers. Each APL and the technical data and identifying
information contained thereon contains a great deal of exacting research by
the ICP. i-Jaoh FSN obtained must be supported by complete descriptive data
including quality control requirements. Baoh APL must be reviewed for ac-
curacy and completeness. Each contraot for procurement of components and
repair parts must be reviewed to determine that proper material is obtained.
These and many other requirements are imposed on ICPs under the administrative
control of NAVSUP.
Observations
An examination of the system utilized by NAVSHIP and NAVSUP reveals
that different procedures exist for providing technical data to field activ-
ities which procure parts for naval vessels. Information provided by NAVSHIP
for procurement of replacement parts generally references a plan, drawing,
pieoe or part number, with little or no qualifying data. In the case of nu-
clear components and repair parts, however, detailed procedures are in effect
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to insure that the NAVSHIP's prime contractor involved provides all require-
ments necessary for replacement procurement of each ship's part. Information
provided is specific and the format for qualifying data reflected on drawings
is on a line item basis. The procedure includes the requirement for an
identification of the exact quality applicable for each part.
In view of the functions and offices involved, it appears evident that
if the work required for the building, conversion, repair, and upkeep of
naval vessels is to be accomplished with dispatch and accuracy, it is incum-
bent upon all NAVSHIP's divisions to furnish to requiring field activities
clear and precise data concerning the supply support and operating require-
ments of the equipments involved. In non-nuclear equipment areas, it is noted
that the internal NAVSHIP procedures applicable to the guidance to be furnished
to SPCC and other field activities for the procurement of ships parts need to
be updated. For example, The Bureau of Ships (BuShips—former name of NAVSHIP)
Instruction 4400.11, which delineates the procurement specifications and tech-
nical data to be furnished to requiring field activities, is dated June 9, 1955,
and specifies that certain information is to be provided to a field supply
activity which is not now in existence.'
In respeot to the acquisition of parts for naval vessels, it is noted
that the ships parts support functions of the Chief of Naval Material (CNM)
are divided between NAVSUP and NAVSHIP. NAVSUP is responsible for supply
policy and inventory management administration through SPCC and other inven-
tory control points. NAVSHIP is responsible for technical guidance and
*U.S., Department of the Navy, Naval Ship Systems Command, BuShips
Instruction 4400.11; Guidance to be Furnished by Bureau of Ships to Supply
Demand Control Points . June 9, 1955, pp. 1-3.
-
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equipment support for ships including their design, development, and
maintenance. While supply support agreements exist betveen NAVSUP and
NAVSKLP to clarify these responsibilities and to provide a basis for
operation, it is evident that CNM has not conducted any special reviews
to insure that these commands have in effect internal procedures applicable
to their support responsibilities and that such procedures are being fol-
lowed to acquire and supply ships parts of the quality required.

CHAPTER III
SUPPLY SUPPORT QUALITY CONTROL PROCEDURES
The existence of ICPs within the NAVSUP and NAVSHIP organizations and
systems was mentioned in Chapters I and II. As previously stated, the ICPs
involved reoeive their technical direction from NAVSHIP and their adminis-
trative guidance from NAVSUP. However, sinoe these ICPs have a great deal
of latitude in determining their modes of operation and interpreting direc-
tion from higher authority, they play an Important part in the quality con-
trol of ships parts. They make determination as to how Navy ships will be
supported, how material will be procured, what technical description will
be used to identify an item, and what measure of quality control is essential
to insure proper procurement.
Sinoe these ICPs play a large part in keeping the Navy operational, it
is appropriate that their internal supply support procedures be examined.
For purposes of this examination, the ships parts support procedures of one
ICP, the Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC), will be considered. This ICP is
responsible for the supply support of hull, mechanical, and electrical equip-
ment for naval vessels. Other ICPs are similar in most important respects,
differing mainly in the type of material supported.
Ships Parts Support Situation
The Navy is a composite warfare system comprised of an intricate mix




warfare system operating is a $15 billion a year operation. Keeping it
supplied takes anywhere from half to two -thirds of that amount, depending
on how the computation is made. 1
The Navy's inventory of active ships includes 271 classes, ranging in
size, cost, and kind from a 1,123 foot, 85,350 ton, $350 million nuclear air-
craft carrier to a 50 foot, 3 ton, $30 thousand "swift" river patrol boat.
These ships are several different things at once. They are floating jungles
of electronic gear, highly technical weapons, communications, and target
acquisitions systems with which the ships fulfill their missions. They are
monstrous plants which function by mean3 of machinery that spans the spectrum
of technology.
^
The complex technical systems the ships support generate a supply
requirement of constant activity. These systems work under the sustained
potential threat of malfunction that formulates not only a requirement for
components and repair items of many kinds that must be provided instantly
on demand but also a requirement calling for a continuing application of past
engineering experience factors to the forecast of future needs.
To perform the mission expected of them, many of these ships with their
varying and simultaneous needs for parts must operate thousands of miles from
bases in different parts of the globe. For example, the First and Second
Fleets are normally positioned near the United States, in the Pacific and
Atlantic Oceans respectively; the Sixth Fleet usually operates in the Mediter-
ranean Sea, and the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific Ocean. 3
^.S., Department of the Navy, Naval Supply Systems Command, Supplying





1 ships oarry parts on board to be as self -sufficient as possible.
The range of these stocks is tailored to the individual ship and is based on
the ship's hull type, installed equipments, relative military essentiality
of the ship's systems, and the composition and size of the crew. The cate-
gories of material carried include equipment related spares and repair parts
and such portable equipment and other items as are necessary for the ship's
operation.
These items are specified in an individual allowance list for each ship
and type of aircraft on board. The items on such lists support more than
230,000 equipments and components. In this regard, it is noted that every
one of the Navy's 900 ships is to a varying extent unique. Each differs from
every other in oertain equipment and repair parts. It is evident that more
than 40,000 of the 230,000 equipments and components are applicable to only
one ship.
The range and depth of parts on an allowance list, that is, those
specific items and the number of each which should be carried aboard ship,
are generally computed to achieve the basic combat endurance of a full 90
days supply as established by the logistic support doctrine of the Chief of
Naval Operations. The ship's allowance list also provides for Insurance
items," or spares and repair parts for which demand cannot be aoourately
predicted, but without which the ship's mission could not be accomplished.
Allowances of ships are revised on an equipment basis as experience
diotates but the major revision or updating of the allowance list takes place




parts involved are identified end described in the allowances, as disoussed
in Chapter II, has much to do with the procedures followed in supplying such
items to the ships involved.
The Navy has long recognized the necessity for properly identifying
each allowance item of material used by it. Back in 1914, the Pay Director,
Mr. Thomas H. Hicks, developed the Navy Standard Catalog, which was to be
a model for many similar catalogs. This catalog proved so suocessful during
and after World War I that Mr. Hicks and his staff were authorized to estab-
lish the Federal Standard Stock Catalog in the 1920* s. To insure a positive
yet brief identification of all items of material, attempt has been made,
since the early days of the Navy Standard Catalog, to assign one and only one
number within a numbering framework to eaoh material item. Prior to 1954,
all items of material used by the Navy were identified in the "Catalog of
Navy Material." Commencing in that year, and pursuant to the Defense Catalog
and Standardization Act of 1952, which directed the establishment of a single
catalog for the Department of Defense, Navy items began to be identified
under a new system of numbering as a part of the "Federal Catalog."**
One complicating faotor relating to the allowances and identification
of the items thereon that are required for the support of ships is that of
the technical nature of ships parts. These parts are generally not readily
available in normal commercial channels. To have these items of the required
quality available when they are needed depends on the positive steps taken
to procure and distribute such parts.
The administrative procedures for providing these parts to naval vessels
involve the performance of a number of functions or tasks. The steps involved
^J.S. t Department of the Navy, Naval Supply Systems Command, Supply
Support of the Navy; NAVSANDA Publication 340 . September 15, 1957, p. 15.
;*n..
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with these tasks oust be taken well in advance of the aotual need to assure
effeotive support of Navy ships. In general, these consist of the determina-
tion of the broad material requirements and the operation or use to be made
of a ship and its equipment.
General Procedure
Onoe a NAVSHIP contract is established with a building yard, 5PCC
starts planning to support the vessel involved. Building schedules are
studied, purohase orders for equipment and components are reviewed, and
internal schedules are developed to provision the vessel and prepare its on-
board allowance lists and C03AL. Obviously, the provisioning prooess in-
volved, as illustrated in Figure 1 on page 43, requires much planning and
coordination of effort. This is especially true when one considers that
rarely is only one vessel being built at a time.
In reoent years, as many as fifty ships at a time are in various stages
of completion requiring intensive program oontrol. However, in order to
simplify what takes plaoe within SPCC , the steps that are taken to support
one vessel will be considered, keeping in mind that procedures outlined can
be multiplied by the number of vessels under construction and further multi-
plied by the number of vessels in operation requiring continuous support.
Each vessel being constructed is composed of thousands of components
and hundreds of thousands of repair parts. Most of these, after various
periods of operation, will require replacement. With this in mind, SPCC is
organized to insure that components and parts will be ready for issue when
needed. A clause is required in every shipbuilding contract which requires
the shipbuilder to provide provisioning documentation to SPCC for each system,
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Fig. 1. —Provisioning Process
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invokes a provisioning specification such as MIL-P -15137, which is designed
to insure that cognizant ICPs receive adequate information to identify and
procure the components and parts required.
Most of the systems and components required to build a vessel are not
manufactured by the shipbuilder but are procured from various manufacturers
or vendors. Therefore, it is necessary that the shipbuilder impose the pro-
visioning requirement on each of his suppliers. As a result, SPCC receives
provisioning projects, NAVSHIP Forms 4736, from the shipbuilder and a variety
of his vendors. iSach provisioning package is expected to be complete with
all necessary drawings and other data required to identify the system, com-
ponent, and repair parts involved.
Let us assume that our one vessel under consideration is composed of
5,000 components. SPCC, by review of shipbuilder listings, specifications
for building the vessel, and other data, can determine at any time which
components have been oovered by provisioning documentation and which still
have to be provisioned. Further, status of allowance list, COSAL information,
and system stock procurement can be determined by data accumulated for the
5,000 components involved.
Most of the 5,000 components involved in our one ship can be categorized
in three major areas: hull, mechanical, or electrical. SPCC, recognizing
the distinct categories of vessel equipment, is organized technically into
sections and units which are best suited to specialize in the type of equip-
ment involved. For example, there are electrical sections, mechanical sec-
tions, and hull sections. These sections are further divided into specialized
units covering such equipment as pumps, valves, propulsion and electrioal
machinery, and power distribution.
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When provisioning documentation is received for any of our 5,000
components, a determination is made as to which section or unit will process
the data involved. Further, the section or unit supervisor will then deter-
mine which individual will review the project and make the various determina-
tions necessary to insure that proper material is eventually available to
support the component on the ship.
The progression of events has led us to the core of our quality assur-
ance concern as it relates to SPCC. The individual is now responsible to
relate all of NAVSKEP and NAVSUP direction to his determination. How well
he is informed and how qualified he is will determine to a large degree what
material will be procured, how much will be procured, and how well it and its
quality requirements are identified. This individual and others like him,
who process any facet of the provisioning documentation, share responsibility
for the end product. If he has been provided all drawings, specifications,
and quality assurance information needed and is technically competent, there
is every reason to believe that the end product in system stock will be com-
pletely suitable for its intended purpose. If any of the foregoing are miss-
ing, the end product could result in a defective prevention or failure report
from the appropriate Supervisor of Shipbuilding, shipyard, repair activity,
or vessel at some future date.
The individual does many things with the provisioning project he is
processing. He prepares source information which will permit publication of
an allowance list. He determines how many of an item are needed in system
stock to support the components installed on the vessel. He determines how
many of an item should be on a tender or support ship to support our vessel
and he determines precisely how each item will be identified for procurement
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purposes. It is this last feature of technical identification of the item
which is most important from the quality assurance aspect.
Most of the items under SPCC's cognizance are identified by plan and
piece and/or part number. Many others require extensive descriptive data
in order to be procured. For common items, a plan, piece end/or part number
constitutes adequate information. However, for more complicated components,
material, and parts, a plan, piece and/or part number is frequently inade-
quate. The specifications provided with the provisioning package often
offer various grades or types of items available. Drawings received are
sometimes not the latest approved by NAVSH1P. Copies of shipbuilder or
vendor purchase orders are sometimes not available or are not complete in
that amendments citing additional requirements are not always provided.
Further, drawings sometimes fail to invoke quality assurance requirements
which are referenced on other documents. All of this complicates the effort
involved in providing suitable support material.
During the processing of provisioning projects, it is mandatory that
the individual technician involved recognize the above inadequacies of ships
parts procurement and related data. All too frequently, though, the tech-
nician, faced with work schedules and huge backlogs, will process these
projects with the limited information available and identify the items in-
volved to the best of his ability in order to move the projects out of his
work area. Although the results of suoh action usually appear, many months
or even years later, in failure reports, it is evident that the technician
initially involved is generally completely unaware of the material require-






For many years, NAVSMP provided provisioning information to SPCC in
the manner described above. Most of the material procured was adequate and
suitable for its intended purpose. An analysis of failure reports within
the NAVSKLP' s Naval Reaotors Division, however, disclosed that certain system
stock items lacked required quality vhioh contributed to the failure of the
item under study. In almost every case, it was determined that SPCC either
did not receive complete information or failed to recognize some of the
special requirements imposed in specifications, purohase orders, or other
documents vhioh were germane to the complete identification of an item. In
order to solve this problem, the NAVSKEP Naval Reactors Commander direoted
their NSTRs to institute the special procedure described in Chapter II. 7
For the past three and one -half years, the Special Propulsion Plant
Branch of SPCC has utilized the supplementary ordering data pages provided
with each provisioning project to insure that complete technical and quality
control data is specified for every item procured. The results are now
apparent. With the exception of a human error, where an individual was
careless, no failure report on nuolear parts has been traced to the improper
procurement of material.
The procedures followed by this branoh require that each item scheduled
for procurement be reviewed against the latest supplementary ordering data
6Unless otherwise noted, the information provided in this chapter is
based on various discussions with both NAVSHIP, NAVSUP, and SPCC personnel.
'U.S., Department of the Navy, Naval Ship Systems Command, Naval Reactor
Procurement Memorandum #3 . Ootober 22, 1963, p. 1 and Enclosure.
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page to Insure that all requirements are specified in the procurement
description. Each procurement description provided by this branch to the
Purchase Division of SPCC is aooompanied by a speoifioation check-off list
on which the specifications applying to the item to be procured are clearly
checked. Spot oheoks of contracts are made to insure that all required
data is inoluded.
Further, technicians in the SPCC Speoial Propulsion Plant Branch are
trained to insure that purchase orders for ships parts invoke applicable
quality requirements and are instructed not to rely on their own understand-
ing as to the required quality if doubt exists. In this respect, the NSTRs
looated at the prime contractors plants have established close liaison with
this Branch for the purpose of insuring that the quality requirements appli-
cable to specific items are clarified as required. Questions concerning
quality assurance requirements, interpretation of specifications, waivers
requested by manufacturers, or lack of technical information are resolved
by letters. Material specifioations for these items and changes or waivers
thereto are without exception approved by the NAVSHIP Nuclear Reactors
Commander.
Observations
Provisioning of system stock material by SPCC appears to be adequate
for most material prooured. However, with the ever-increasing complexity of
naval vessels and some of the specialized equipment involved, much can be
done to improve system stock procurement for suoh equipment. This improvement
can be accomplished by the improvement in the technical and procurement re-




Normally, manufacturers know more about their product than others not
directly associated with the item. Frequently, special processes and in-
house quality assurance procedures of vendors are not reflected on drawings.
As a result, when procuring non-nuclear items from others, SPGC is not
oapable of applying every requirement to a purchase description. Since
SPCC is charged with the responsibility of proouring every possible item
on a non-proprietory basis, the non -availability of such information is
beooming increasingly acute. While the local machine shops and smaller
suppliers endeavor to provide items strictly as described, quality control
prooesses required and not specified result in the receipt of inferior parts.
Even if these requirements are detected, suoh detection often results in
requests for waivers whioh are granted by individuals who generally are not
fully cognizant of the special quality required.
The nuclear program procedures discussed in this chapter and Chapter II
appear to be as exacting as can be established at this date. All require-
ments are clearly indicated. SPCC technicians do not have to depend on
their own understanding or estimation of what the requirements should be.
In this respect, it is noted that the specifications for these ships parts
and the waivers or changes thereto are approved by one organization, the
NAVSHIP Naval Reaotors Division. Adherence to this type of quality control
procedure appears sound in that the more people and organizations you have
doing this the greater the chance is for differences or inconsistencies to
appear in material requirements and in the quality of the items obtained.
Every ICP has programs or systems whioh are considered the most impor-
tant from a quality standpoint. For example, SPCC has the Nuolear Program,
SubSafe Program, Shipboard Inertial Navigation System (SINS), and the Nuclear
&gnu
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Weapons Program. Each of these, and others vhioh are vital to ship operation
and mission, requires a supply support system that consistently provides
ships parts of the quality required. Unless quality control procedures
similar to that now employed in the nuclear program are adopted, individuals
at SPCC will continue to exercise their best judgment in determining appli-
cable specifications for ships parts vhioh may or may not be adequate. Poor
judgment can only result in less than adequate material, vhioh could result





The Introduction described the need for better quality material at
reasonable prices. It also highlighted the fact that despite current efforts,
failure reports continue to be received from users of the material. It was
further indicated that a comprehensive examination of the current adminis-
trative system and procedural techniques utilized by NAVSHIP, NAVSUP, and
their field activities would be a fruitful means of identifying corrective
measures.
Objective
As a part of this examination, it is appropriate to review whether
or not the system is currently yielding satisfactory results. For as one
management analyst has stated:
The operating effectiveness of an area under study can best be ascer-
tained by a comparison of the present conditions with those that were
intended by its design, policy, and procedures. 1
This chapter seeks to appraise the performance of the current system in
terms of the failure reports received for ships parts. Its objectives are to:
1. Define the NAVSHIP and NAVSUP failure report procedures,
2. Examine failure report information for new parts for ships, and
3. Identify problem areas and weaknesses observed.
^-Systems and Procedures: A Handbook for Business and Industry, ed.





At 0917 on 10 April 1963, the USS THRESHER, SS(N)593, was lost in a
tragio aooident which gave every indication of equipment malfunction. Prior
to this time, quality control was indeed a program, but with the exception of
one or two areas was a program with insufficient emphasis. The USS THRESHER
disaster generated a concern for quality assurance in the Navy which had no
previous counterpart.
Navy and Congressional investigations of the USS THRESHER incident
highlighted many inadequacies in current quality assurance and quality con-
trol administrative progress. In many cases, the programs were established
but frequently not adhered to in a manner whioh would guarantee compliance.
As a result, existing programs became important, and new programs were de-
veloped to provide a degree of quality assurance previously not envisioned.^
Just two months and ten days before the USS THRESHER disaster, BuShips
issued an Instruction whioh set up a Defect Prevention Report (DPR) program.
3
The instruction established the actions to be taken to prevent recurrence of
defects in new parts for ships. It defines the action that engineers and
others must take on DPRs and it requires coordination of the program within
NAVSHIP.
When new GFM or CFE is found to be defective upon receipt, or during
installation aboard ship, naval shipyards, repair facilities, and supervisors
of shipbuilding personnel are required to prepare and issue a DPR, identified
^.S., Congress, Joint Committee on Atomio Energy, Hearings on Loss of
the USS Thresher . 88th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess., 1964, pp. 1-192.
^U.S., Department of the Navy, Naval Ship Systems Command, BuShips
Instruction 4355.24; Establishment of Quality Assurance Program, Actions for






by Report Control Symbol 4355-1. Procedures stipulate that these reports
shall be as complete as possible so as to permit analysis by the receiving
activity for determining the required preventive action.
The initial instruction established a program to prevent recurrence
of defects in nev shipboard equipment which had been inspected at source by
a government representative. In October 1964, however, BuShips modified
this program and furnished instructions for actions to prevent recurrence
of defects in ships parts which are received from stock maintained by the
4Naval Supply System.
Copies of DPRs are now submitted either to NAVSHIP and/or the ICP
involved and the appropriate DCASR or Inspector of Navy Material (INM)
.
Reports are sent to NAVSHIP for action when the defect is considered a result
of inadequate speoifioation requirements or the defect is on GFM. If the
defective material came from the Naval Supply System, a copy of the DPR is
sent to the cognizant ICP for action. These reports are sent to the appro-
priate DCASR or INM for action when the defect is attributed to lack of
conformance to specifications and/or was not detected due to deficiencies
in quality assuranoe actions by the respective contractor.
The technical branches of NAVSHIP review the defect prevention reports.
If the cause for defective items is the lack of adequate requirements, these
branches are to initiate appropriate action for the correction of directives,
specifications, and other technical documents. These branches are instructed
to inform the activity originating the reports what NAVSHIP action is being
taken.
^J.S., Department of the Navy, Naval Ship Systems Command, Bu3hip3
Instruction 4355; Quality Assurance Program. Prevention of Recurrence of
Defects in Equipment Obtained from Stock . October 28, 1964, pp. 1-2.
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For GFM, when the defect is considered a contractor responsibility,
the applicable NAV3HIP technical branoh reports the defect to the prime
equipment contractor via the cognizant DCASR or INM. The DCASR or INM will
conduct a complaint investigation to determine the cause of the defect and
initiate the preventive action required.
The action to be taken upon receipt of a DPR at SPCC , or other ICPs,
depends upon the cause of the defect. SPCC usually purges the stock in the
supply system to remove the defective material and requests its replacement
by the contractor. Additionally, upon being informed of a defect, SPCC in-
sures that the supplier involved states the cause and actions taken to pre-
vent recurrence of similar defects. In all cases, however, copies of any
SPCC correspondence involved in the processing of a DPR are to be provided
to the complaining activity, NAVSHIP, NAVSUP, and the applicable government
inspectors when material is actually defective and the contract number is
known.
It was noted that other procedures are in effect which require that
defects and failures of in-servioe equipment be reported on NAVSHIP Form 3621
to NAVSHIP and other activities involved. 5 The procedures also include a
requirement for a report on NAVSUP 4440-80 of those defective consumable and
repairable items that have been accepted into the Naval Supply System.
These procedures generally provide instructions for handling defective
*TJ.S., Department of the Navy, Naval Ships Systems Command, BuShips
Instruction 9000.16; Report of Equipment Failure . May 9, 1960, pp. 1-4 and
Enclosure
.
^J.S., Department of the Navy, Naval Supply Systems Command, NAVSUP
Instruction 4440.120; Reporting of Defective Material Obtained through the
Supply System . Jeptember 16, 1966, pp. 1-4 and Enclosure.

material detected which does not fall within the purview of the procedure
disoussed above. The defect and failure reports involved oover such items
as those that are shipped between stock points, in stock, and are in opera-
tion.
The above procedures provide a feedback system that is an essential
and critical aspect of NAVSHIP's and NAVSUP's quality and reliability assur-
ance programs. By feeding data and other information back to proper points
in the planning, design, procurement, and production chain, as illustrated
in Figure 2 on page 56, it is possible to continually reduce product vari-
ability, to improve processes, and to check the efficiency of the quality
and reliability assurance program itself. Feedback information indicates
the operational reliability of a product, whether it be a plan, intermediate
material, or an end produot, and provides the data required for an effective
improvement of the processes involved.
Failure Report Information7
In calendar year 1964, the first full year after the USS THRESHER
disaster, a review of failure report information indicates that 24 shipbuild-
ing and other activities submitted DPRs for new ships parts. A list of the
activities that submitted reports along with a definition of the sixteen de-
fect report categories used, such as pressure test, dimensions incorrect,
and parts missing, are reflected in Appendix I.
7Unless otherwise indicated, the information reflected in this chapter,
inoluding the tables and appendices referenced, is based on information ex-
tracted from the official files of NAVSHIP, NAYSUP, SPCC , and a pamphlet
published by the Naval Ship Engineering Center, Assurance Engineering Code




































Fig. 2.--Defect Prevention Feedback System
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A volume of 1,334 individual defect prevention reports for new ships
parts vere received. Table 1 on page 58 indioates the different types of
defeot reports submitted. It also indioates the type of actions initiated
for these reports.
A reviev of Table 1 shows that three of the shipyard and repair activ-
ities involved submitted no reports and about 46 percent submitted less than
ten. This, however, is an increase in the number of reports received over
1963 when thirteen activities did not submit any reports. It appeared that
this increase in reports was primarily a result of a wider compliance with
the program in 1964, the first year after the loss of USS THRESHER, rather
than an increase in the number of actual defective parts received.
Table 2 on page 59 provides a breakdown, on a percentage basis, of
the relation of the defects in each of the sixteen categories involved to
the total number of defects reported in calendar year 1964. The sixteen
defect categories were reported 1,511 times. 633 defects were associated
with CFM and 378 were associated with CFS. The difference between 1,334,
the number of DPRs for oalendar year 1964, and 1,511, the types of defeots,
is a result of the DPR recording a defeot in more than one category.
A review of Table 2 indicates that the higher percentages for CFE
defeots are 20.5 and 16.8 and that these are applicable to the material and
workmanship categories respectively. Defeots attributed to material and
workmanship for GFM are also among the higher percentages reported, amount-
ing to 9.6 and 23.4 respectively. As noted in Appendix 1, defeots categorized
as workmanship are a result of items showing evidenoe of poor or faulty fab-
rication or assembly including the presence of dirt, burrs, and foreign mat-
ter. Those attributed to material are a result of items failing to meet







































BSN 3 17 - 1
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Totals 738 t^ 327 92 840 41
Notes:
Several INN complaint investigations on the 1964 DPRs are on file in
BuShips, but they were received in 1965 after the 31 December 1964 report cut-
off date. These have not been included in these totals.
Activity numbers 20 and 24*46 have been reserved for INDMAN and other




DEFECTS CATEGORIZED BY CHARACTER OF DEFECT FOR 1964
CFE GFM
Defeot * Defect i
1. Mechanical Test 35 4.0 26 4.1
2. Non-Destructive Test 22 2.5 1 .1
3. Pressure Test 40 4.5 5 .8
4. Eleotrioal/Eleotronio Test 50 5.6 120 19.0
5. Workmanship 147 16.8 148 23.4
6. Identification 119 13.6 65 10.3
7. Damage 50 5.6 88 14.0
8. Missing Parts 19 2.1 38 6.0
9. Dimension Incorrect 112 12.8 34 5.4
10. Material 179 20.5 61 9.6
11. Machining 23 2.6 8 1.2
12. Welding 8 1.1 12 1.9
13. Soldering 2 .2 4 .6
14. Preservation/Paokaging/Packlng 20 2.2 21 3.3
15. Shelf Life 3 .3 2 .3
16. No Objective Evidence of Inspect
Totals
ion 49 5.6 .0




The resume presented below is typioal of the DPRs forwarded.
Company X transferred to Company Y a main propulsion reduction gear,
a hydraulic pump motor, and a olutoh control panel. These units listed
below were rejeoted at receiving inspection and were reported on a DPR
for the reasons indicated.
Propulsion Reduction Gear
1. Rust had accumulated on the internal gears, inside the hinged
inspection plates, and related parts.
2. The chains that fasten the padlocks to the casing were secured
in a poor manner. These padlocks could drop into the gear case
when the hinged inspection plates were open.
3. Rust was on lower casing and piping.
Hydraulic Pump Motor
1. A direction or rotation arrow was missing.
2. A lead clamp had not been provided.
3. Terminal leads were not properly identified.
Clutch Control Cabinet
1. The wrong type of wire was used.
2. Locking devices were missing in several places throughout the
cabinet.
3. The easy code markers did not oomply with the requirements of
BuShips letter 9620.66, Serial No. 660E-385 of May 8, 1961.
4. The cover was inaccessible.
As a direct result of the Defeot Prevention Report received on these
units, BuShips requested that INM advise the prime contractor involved
of the defeots on the reduction gear. BuShips also requested that a
In* iyjq save i





complaint investigation be performed and that a report of the findings
and aotions taken to prevent recurrence be forwarded to BuShips.
Investigation determined that the rusted oondition of the main
propulsion reduction gears had been caused by inadequate preservation
and improper storage during the interim storage period prior to ship-
ment to Company Y. It was evident that the roof had been leaking over
the area where the unit had been stored. As a result, the IMM office
instituted action to physically evaluate the oondition of all reduotion
gear and turbine units in storage at Company X.
Slides and photographs taken of the rusted conditions were for-
warded to Company X and shown to all assembly and test men, shippers,
management, and quality control personnel. Many constructive comments
were generated among those who received these photos, and a greater
appreciation was obtained for adequate preservation and protection
during storage periods. The repair and correction of the rust condi-
tions was accomplished to the satisfaction of Company Y and the Navy.
The chains securing the padlocks were improperly selected for this
application. A design change was made to properly secure chains to
the casing, eliminating the possibility of padlocks dropping into the
gear casing.
The defects pertaining to the motor and oontrol cabinet as reported
on the DPR involved strengthening of specifications. This resulted in
action by BuShips to correct and revise the specifications involved.
The detection and correction of these defects at a point in time prior
to installation aboard ship saved many manhours in time and money. If these





of operating personnel and equipments vould have been placed in jeopardy.
A reviev of failure report information for calendar year 1965 reveals
that twenty -three activities submitted DPRs on new parts for shipbuilding
and repair of ships. As a result of the revision to BuShips initial DPR
Instruction, as previously mentioned, the information submitted included
defects for new ships parts reoeived from ICP's stock. As to the defect
terms used, two defeot categories, one pertaining to technical data and the
other to a design deficiency, were added to the sixteen categories used in
1964. A list of the aotivities that submitted DPRs along with a definition
of tvo additional defeot oategories used in 1965 is reflected in Appendix 11.
A total of 1,716 individual defeot prevention reports were received in
1965. Table 3 on page 63 indicates the number of the different types of
defeots submitted. This table also reflects the corrective actions initiated
and oompleted for these reports.
A review of Table 3 reveals that three of the shipyard and repair
activities involved submitted no reports and about 29 percent submitted less
than ten. Even with one less aotivity reporting, 1,501 valid DPRs were re-
ceived in 1965 as oompared to 1,334 DPRs received in 1964. The 215 DPRs in
the column designated "OTHSRS" are considered invalid in that they were er-
roneously issued against stock items for obvious reasons such as wrong shelf
issue, mixed stock, and wrong stock numbers. Despite the continual increase
in the number of DPRs reoeived, discussions with various NAVSHIP, NAVSUP,
and SPCC officials indicate that additional emphasis on this program is still
required for maximum benefit.
Table 4 on page 64 provides a breakdown, on a peroentage basis, of the
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Amt i Amt i Amt i
1. Mechanioal Test 24 2.4 9 1.7 10 2.3
2. Non-Destructive Test 98 10.0 - - 15 3.4
3. Pressure Test 14 1.4 5 .9 12 2.7
4. Electrical/Electronic Test 23 2.3 98 18.3 31 7.0
5. Workmanship 136 13.7 131 24.4 48 10.9
6. Identification 81 8.1 16 3.0 13 2.9
7. Damage 48 4.8 71 13.2 60 13.6
8. Missing Parts 11 1.1 20 3.8 5 1.1
9. Dimension Incorrect 77 7.8 22 4.1 33 7.5
10. Material 206 20.7 96 17.9 128 29.0
11. Machining 11 1.1 4 .7 3 .7
12. Welding 9 .9 4 .7 - -
13. Soldering 3 .3 - - - -
14. Preservation/Packaging/Packing 12 1.2 43 8.0 40 9.0
15. Shelf Life - - 2 .4 21 4.7
16. No Objective Evidence
of Inspection 227 22.9 3 .5 15 3.4
17. Technical Data 9 .9 5 .9 4 .q
18. Design Deficiency
Totals
4 .4 8 1.5 4 .9
993 100.0 537 100.0 442 100.0
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for the three groups of material involved. The 1,501 valid DPRs are cate-
gorised by the nature of the defioienoy and classified into eighteen defect
categories. The eighteen defect categories were reported for a total of
1,972 times; 537 were associated with GFM, 993 were associated with CFE,
and 442 were associated with stock items from ICPs. The difference between
1,501, the number of valid DPRs reported, and 1972, the number of defect
categories reported, is a result of many DPRs containing defects in more
than one oategory.
A review of Table 4 indicates that DPRs due to workmanship and material
represent the higher of the percentages reported for the eighteen defect
categories. DPRs with defects recorded in the material oategory represent
20.7, 17.9, and 29.0 peroent of the CFE, GFM, and ICP items respectively.
DPRs with defects recorded in the workmanship oategory represent 13.7, 24.4,
and 10.9 peroent of the CFE, GFM, and ICP items respectively. Of the remain-
ing sixteen defect categories, twelve, thirteen, and twelve for the CFE, GFM,
and ICP items, respectively, show less than five percent for each category.
In processing corrective aotions on DPRs by cognizant activities such
as DCASR, NAVSKEP, or the ICPs, delay is encountered. This is due to time
required to receive the DPR, physically perform the investigation, and sub-
mit the formal reply.
The case report described below is typical of defeotive material
received from the Naval Supply System.
The Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Bay City, Michigan, submitted a
DPR to the Ships Parts Control Center, Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania, on
two magnetic compasses manufactured by Company Z. These compasses were




to Bay City. Receiving inspection at Bay City rejected the
compasses because of the following defects:
1. Compass liquid was dirty.
2. Compass card was discolored.
3. Immediate area around screw head was deteriorated.
The compasses were returned to the manufacturer for investigation,
analysis, and corrective action. The findings were:
1. Insufficient compass cleaning at final assembly caused compass
liquid contamination which in turn was responsible for compass
card discoloration, and
2. Improper handling and storage at the Naval Supply Center,
Norfolk, resulting in a bent oard support which was responsible
for compass card sticking.
Both compasses were repaired by the manufacturer and returned to
the Naval Supply Center.
Company Z has promised to exercise greater care in future produc-
tion in an effort to avoid recurrence of this problem. The cognizant
government quality assuranoe representative advised that he would exer-
cise additional surveillance of the company's cleaning procedure.
As a result of this DPR, SPCC's stock purge resulted in the discovery
of two additional compasses in stock with the same defects. These were also
returned and repaired by the manufacturer. Action by SPCC in effecting
repair of the two other compasses in the stock system was accomplished at




In shipbuilding and ship repair, the assurance of quality in design,
procurement and production traditionally has been largely informal, unre-
corded, and unsystematic.*1 As the implications of a mistake become more
and more expensive, there is a greater need for predetermined and systematic
definition of what will be checked, what records will be kept, and what the
results of analyzing the records mean in terms of corrective action.
Even though the DPR Program is costly, it is most desirable. Although
no precise figure can be placed on the total cost of such a program as the
DPR for assuring quality as an average for all industry or government, it
has been recognized by professional societies and major industries of the
United States that 8 to 15 percent of the total cost of an operation may be
involved in securing adequate quality in the final product. In the aerospace
industries, this oost has occasionally risen to 300 percent of the total cost
of an individual product and to 75 percent of the total contract oost to
secure adequate assurance of reliability. For the shipbuilding and ship
repair industry this would appear to be unreasonable. A brief review of
current new ship construction and repair practices indicates that such costs
are now approaching and exceeding 15 percent and are expected to increase in
Q
the next few years.
The DPR program, while it obviously costs money, can ultimately save
even more than it oosts. By locating faulty material before installation,
^.S., Department of the Navy, Naval Ship Systems Command, Quality
Assuranoe Orientation
. October 20, 1966, p. 4.
%.S., Department of the Navy, Naval Ship Systems Command, Quality





extensive disassembly of equipment oan be averted. Past experience has
shown that sea trials are an expensive way to locate faulty material.
Frequently, faulty material is so located that good ship piping and other
equipment must be removed to get to a faulty component or part. While the
DPR program administrative costs may be high, they usually are cheap when
compared to the tangible and intangible coats associated with this type of
operation. °
It is an objective of shipbuilders and ship operators to use ships
parts of a quality that will perform adequately and have such items as may
be required in ready -for-use condition to meet building and operational com-
mitments. Since it is difficult to establish an inflexible standard as to
what constitutes a quality part, it is generalized or assumed that an item
is a quality part if it will perform adequately to its design requirements.
Any defect that would prevent this constitutes substandard material. There-
fore, an increase in the volume of reports on defective ships parts, while
frequently resulting in building schedule setbaoks, must be properly dealt
with if the objeotive desired is to be obtained.
It is evident that the number of defects submitted in connection with
the DPR program is on the increase. A review of prior performance revealed
that DPRs submitted inoreased from a total of 279 in 1963 to 1,334 in 1964
to 1,501 in 1965. While these reports are increasing, it is apparent that
some reporting activities are not actively participating in the DPR program.
Five activities have submitted five or less DPRs. Of the twenty -three ship-
yard, repair facility, and supervisor of shipbuilding offices currently




required to report, two have not as yet submitted any DPRs. The reporting
activities involved have a shipbuilding and ship repair production volume
sufficient to indicate that all significant costly and recurring defects
are not being reported.
In discussions with NAVSHIP, NAVSUP, and SPCC officials, it was re-
vealed that deficiencies in ships parts are not always reported back through
the oomplete chain for the information and corrective action of designers,
specification writers, and others who need to know. In fact, it was noted
that INDMANs involved in ship construction and repair at private contractor
12
sites are ourrently excluded from the DPR program. It was also noted that
13private shipbuilders do not perform test inspections for GFM. While it
appeared that aotion is to be taken to correct this and that aotion is
initiated to correct defeots detected for the ships parts involved, it is
evident that the information generated thereby is not, in the interim, being
fed back to all parties concerned to minimize the recurrence of such defects.
While the above highlights certain problem areas and weaknesses of the
DPR program, it was noted that the DPRs themselves do not, in many cases,
oonvey all the important parameters connected with the defeots being reported.
Defect identification information, such as a specification paragraph, drawing,
and description of the part or section thereof that is defective, and recom-
mended corrective aotion to be taken to preclude recurrence are frequently
not included in the report.
^U.S., Department of the Navy, Naval Ship Systems Command, Naval Ship
ftlgineering Center Notice 4355; Serial 6609.1-361
. July 8, 1966, p. 17.
12Ibid., p. 5.
13U.S., Department of the Navy, Naval Ship Systems Command, Quality/
Reliability Assurance Program . August, 1964, pp. 4-16.
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It was observed that DPR replies, or reports of DPR investigations
and corrective actions, do not always provide evidence of adequate investi-
gation and/or corrective aotion. In fact, a notioe issued by the Naval
Ship Engineering Center indicates that DPR replies frequently fail to indi-
cate that an investigation, a corrective aotion, and a report is required
by eaoh of the responsible activities involved. In this regard, it was also
evident that the most common faults with DPR replies are that:
1. Copies are not being furnished to appropriate offices, and
2. Responsible offioes are failing to indioate the aotion that they
are taking or will take to prevent a recurrence of the defect involved.^*
From the information reviewed, it was observed that the data obtained
on ships parts from the collection of the three different types of failure
reports was to be used to:
1. Prevent the supply of questionable or unsatisfactory parts to
ships
,
2. Correct production errors and processes,
3. Correct design errors or inadequacies,
4. Assist in maintenance management,
5. Determine replacement requirements, and
6. Establish the extent of supplier and government responsibility.
While several NAVSHIP, NAVSUP, and SPCC officials attested to the feasibility
and desirability of reducing the three forms to one, no action was in process
to formulate one uniform report for accomplishing the purposes involved.
It was noted that administrative actions designed to accomplish the
purposes listed above were being initiated on a defective report or item by







a defeotive report or item basis. The peroent of failure of the items
reflected in these reports in respect to the total population of such items
was not being considered. Trend information in respeot to the number of
defects for a particular equipment or system, suoh as SINS or SubSafe equip-
ments, was not determined or evaluated. The information accumulated was
neither related to a mission nor compared to a standard of performance ex-
pected for the areas involved. Notably missing from the information re-
ceived was the cost of the various items for which defeot information was
being received and prooessed. In addition to follow-ups frequently being
too slow to expedite the processing of suoh information, no time limit was
imposed as to when the reports were to be submitted for the defeots detected
and when administrative actions were to be completed on suoh reports by the
parties involved.
•'




The author's observations and recommendations are based on a limited
review of the broad and complex organizations and administrative oontrols
applioable to the quality of parts for naval vessels. Recognising the
limitations of such a review, this chapter will include a Bummary of sig-
nificant observations and will provide recommendations considered worthy
of study and/or initiation to correct the administrative weaknesses de-
tected. The opinions expressed herein are strictly those of the author
and have no official sanction.
Summary of Recommendations
From the information reviewed, it was evident that the organizational
relationships of NAVSHIP and NAVSUP in respect to their responsibilities
for the acquisition of ships parts are clearly defined. Shortcomings in
the relationships appear to stem primarily from procedural faults rather
than any major organizational defects. Certain procedures were noted to
be outdated and in some oases inadequate. While the ships parts support
functions of CNM are dearly divided between NAVSHIP and NAVSUP, CNM has
neither policed the relationships that have developed between these commands
nor oonducted any reviews to insure that appropriate quality control pro-
cedures for the acquisition of ships parts are in effect within NAVSHIP




It was observed that the supply support quality oontrol procedures
applicable to the acquisition of ships parts were different for different
parts. With the exoeption of nuolear parts, the technical and procurement
related data reoeived by SPCC was observed to be somewhat incomplete in
that the exact requirements as to the quality required was often subject
to the interpretation and judgment of the SPCC technician involved. It
appeared evident that the quality processes required for some parts were
known only by oertain manufacturers. While the procedures followed appeared
adequate for standard stock items, it was apparent that improvement in the
technical data provided SPCC in terms of the quality required for specialized
parts that are essential to a ship's mission was needed.
A review of the results of these procedures in terms of the NAVSHIP
and NAVSUP defective prevention reports revealed that all information on
ships parts defeots are not being submitted to NAVSHIP, NAVSUP, and SPCC.
As to those being reported, it was evident that present procedures do not
require that defects detected in ships parts be submitted and corrective
action thereon be completed within a prescribed time period. As to the
reports reoeived, it was observed that the items with defeots are not being
evaluated in respect to either the percentage they represent of the total
population in use or their effeot on the mission, program, or system and
equipment assembly or system involved. While actions taken on the reports
reviewed appeared to be improving the quality of ships parts, additional
emphasis was obviously needed to expedite present processing, expand informa-
tion being reported, and generate the development of a uniform system of







The following recommendations are based upon research oonduoted
within the limitation imposed in the Introduction of this paper and as
suoh are not deemed to be all inolusive or infallible. It is recognized
that work may be proceeding on some of these recommendations. For others,
the difficulties are great and implementation may prove to be unfeasible
from a practical viewpoint. However, they are in every oase deserving of
consideration. Adoption of any or all will aid in the achievement of
greater reliability in ships parts.
Centralized direction in the administrative control of quality of
ships parts is vested in the CNM. CNM should periodically review the
quality control procedures of NAVSHIP and NAVSUP to insure that they are
current and that they are accomplishing the objectives that CNM has assigned
to these two commands.
NAVSHIP and NAVSUP should periodically review their internal quality
control procedures and those of their field activities to insure that they
are updated to oonform with ourrent requirements. To insure that NAVSHIP'
s
technical and NAVSUP* s management responsibilities in respect to the quality
control of ships parts are properly fulfilled, it is reoommended that all
changes to present quality control procedures be concurred in by both
parties. Areas of dissension should be resolved by CNM.
Since the furnishing of quality requirements for the procurement of
ships parts is a responsibility of NAVSHIP, action should be taken by this
command to insure that suoh requirements are provided appropriate procurement
activities and changes or waivers thereto are approved by it for each part




determination by NAVSHIP as to the parts involved and a development of
a format for furnishing suoh information to the naval procuring activities
affected. The prooedure currently followed for identifying quality re-
quirements for nuolear parts appears sound and should be considered for
application in non-nuclear areas. In any event, one uniform system for
providing quality requirements for ships parts to procurement activities
should be developed and followed.
As to the reports on defective parts, it is recommended that one
form be developed and used. In this respect, present defective report
procedures should be modified to require that defects detected be reported
and corrective action thereon be completed within a speoified time period.
As to the defective prevention report system, it should be enlarged to in-
clude all activities involved with shipbuilding and ship repair and should
require the submission of suoh additional information that is needed not
only to evaluate trends in respect to ships systems or programs and equip-
ment but also to aid in the measurement and improvement of mission effec-
tiveness and performance of vendors and others involved in providing
quality parts for naval vessels.
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APPENDIX I
LIST OF DEFECT REPORTING ACTIVITIES AND
DEFINITIONS OF DEFECT CATEGORIES
1964
Reporting Activity
Key Number Reporting Activity
1 U.S. Naval Shipyard, Boston, Massachusetts
2 U.S. Naval Shipyard, Charleston, South Carolina
3 U.S. Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, California
4 U.S. Naval Shipyard, Mare Island, California
5 U.S. Naval Shipyard, New York, Nev York
6 U.S. Naval Shipyard, Norfolk, Virginia
7 U.S. Naval Shipyard, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
8 U.S. Naval Shipyard, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
9 U.S. Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire
10 U.S. Naval Shipyard, Puget Sound, Washington
11 U.S. Naval Shipyard, San Franoisoo, California
12 Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Bath, Maine
13 Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Bay City, Michigan
14 Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Camden, New Jersey
15 Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Groton, Connecticut
16 Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Long Beaoh, California
17 Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Newport News, Virginia
18 Supervisor of Shipbuilding, New York, New York




21 Supervisor of Shipbuilding, San Francisco, California
22 Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Seattle, Washington
23 Supervisor of Shipbuilding, New Orleans, Louisiana
28 Indman, 5th Naval District, Norfolk, Virginia
47 Naval Air Station, Seattle, Washington
Definitions of Defect Categories:
1. Mechanical Test - Item fails to meet Functional or Operational
Test Requirements.
2. Non-Destructive Test - Item fails to meet Non-Destructive Test
Requirements, i.e., Radiographic, Ultrasonic, Magnetic Particle,
Fluorescent Penetrant, Dye Penetrant, or other types of Non-
Destructive Tests.
3. Pressure Test - Item fails to meet Pressure Requirements (gas,
liquid, etc.), i.e., Pre -installation, Installation, or Operational.
4. Electrical/Electronic Test - Item fails to meet Electrical/Eleotronio
Operational or Functional Requirements.
5. Workmanship - Item shows evidence of poor or faulty fabrication or
assembly including dirt, burrs, foreign matter.
6. Identification - Not identified as ordered (improper marking, lack
of marking, insufficient marking).
7. Damage - Damage that impairs the usefulness or value of an item.
8. Missing Parts - Part or parts missing from assembly or set.
9. Dimensions Incorrect - Item fails to meet Requirements of Plan (DWG)
and/or Procurement Document.




11. Machining - Item shovs evidenoe of poor machining praotioe
(surface finish, eto.).
12. Welding - Item shows visual evidenoe of poor welding (spatter, etc.)
13. Soldering - Item shows visual evidenoe of poor soldering (excessive
solder, etc.).
14. Preservation/Paokaging/Paoking - Item improperly preserved,
packaged, or paoked, or inadequate preservation, packaging, or
packing requirements.
15. Shelf Life - Item stored for periods that reduced or exceeded
maximum item life.
16. No objective evidenoe of Inspection - Item not subjected to





LIST OF REVISED DEFECT REPORTING ACTIVITIES
AND DEFINITIONS OF DiSFECT CATEGORIES
1965
Reporting Activity
Key Number Reporting Activity
1 U.S. Naval Shipyard, Boston, Massachusetts
2 U.S. Naval Shipyard, Charleston, South Carolina
3 U.S. Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, California
4 U.S. Naval Shipyard, Mare Island Division,
San Franoisco, California
5 U.S. Naval Shipyard, New York, New York
6 U.S. Naval Shipyard, Norfolk, Virginia
7 U.S. Naval Shipyard, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii
8 U.S. Naval Shipyard, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
9 U.S. Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire
10 U.S. Naval Shipyard, Puget Sound, Washington
11 U.S. Naval Shipyard, Hunters Point Division,
San Franoisoo, California
12 Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Bath, Maine
13 Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Bay City, Michigan
14 Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Camden, New Jersey
15 Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Groton, Connecticut
16 Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Long Beach, California
17 Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Newport News, Virginia




19 Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Pasoagoula , Mississippi
21 Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Hunters Point Division,
San Franoisoo, California
22 Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Seattle, Washington
23 Supervisor of Shipbuilding, New Orleans, Louisiana
24 Supervisor of Shipbuilding, Jacksonville, Florida
The same defect category terms as used in Appendix I for the 1964 calendar
year apply with the addition of the following two categories:
17. Technical Data - Engineering drawings and other technical documents
did not oontain adequate and accurate data and/or procedures, i.e.,
operation, maintenance, repair, manufacturing, or installation data.
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